System Health Monitoring and Reactive Measures Activation



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
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System Health Monitoring Architecture



Component Implementation Status

Component	Design & Implementation Status	Integration status
Alert Optimization	 Implementing a framework to improve alert priority based on: Effect of Alert Frequency of each Alert Acceptable number of alert per day 	- Prediction - Risk Assessment
Prediction	- Testing prediction algorithm(HMM) with MIT Dataset (Network packets)	- Alert Optimization
Online Risk Assessment	- Designing Asset Database for risk assessment - Testing risk assessment algorithm(HMM) with MIT Dataset (Network packets)	- Alert Optimization
Prevention	 Using Target Communication Framework (TCF) to apply Reactive Measures Identified 35 Reactive Measures Implemented 20 Reactive Measures 	




Alert Optimization



Alert Optimization

- Alert optimization component keeps all alerts but increases some alert priority with correlation concepts
- Alert correlation means to extract true alerts from alerts generated by detection component (filter view)
- Multi steps attack's actions are unknown but may be partially detected by detection component and reported as alerts




Prediction




Prediction Structure

- The prediction component will attempt to make a prediction of a possible future problem
- A model is needed to capture the interaction between the attacker and the distributed network



Prediction Algorithms-HMM



Risk Assessment



System Health Monitoring Architecture

Detection Data Gathering Prevention Detection 1 Detection n **Detection 2** Client Side Alerts (real priority) **Alert Optimization** Plan User 1 User 2 Strategy Notify Admin **Alert Priority Alerts Correlation** Block Server side Alerts (new priority) **Update Alerts** S2 Sn S3 Correlation Database Plan 1 (Notify Administrator) Reset Alerts Alerts Plan 2 (Backup) Alerts Priority 2 3 Plan 3 (Block IP) Risk Index Plan n (Shutdown) **Risk Assessment Prediction** 1 0.9 8.0 0.8_{P3} Compromise 0.7 Risk 0.7 **Asset Database** Normal State 0.6 0.6 Index 0.5 Attempt 0.5 0.4 0.4 Progress 0.3 P2 0.3 **Online Processing** Compromize 0.2 0.2 0.1 P1 Alert 2 Alert n

Risk Assessment

- Risk assessment is the process of identifying, characterizing, and understanding risk.
- The result of risk assessment, risk index, provides decision support for the prevention component.
- Risk index has three aspects:
 - The probability that an abnormal activity detected is a true problem
 - The probability that a problem can successfully compromise its target
 - The severity of the consequences



Prevention



System Health Monitoring Architecture


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Prevention

- Prevention component will try to run good strategies to trigger reactive measures with the objective of:
 - Preventing the problem growth
 - Returning system to the healthy mode




Prevention Architecture





Manager Section

- Manager activates
 - Create a channel to the target computer by TCF facility
 - Select appropriate strategy (it can be static and depends on organization policy)
 - Send the next round of Reactive Measures based on Risk Index of network
 - Apply Reactive Measure on target computer by TCF agent




Strategy Section

- An intrusion can be defined as any set of actions that threaten the Integrity,
 Confidentiality and Availability of host/network resources such as:
 - User account
 - File
 - Kernel
 - •
- So, our strategies to tackle this problems are:
 - MAX-Confidentiality (e.g. Military organization)
 - MAX-Integrity (e.g. Bank service)
 - Recovery (e.g. Scientific organization University)
 - Analysis (e.g. Security laboratory)
 - Catch (e.g. Security laboratory Police)



Reactive Measures running policy

- Each strategy has its own ordering of reactive measures
- Each reactive measure has a static **risk threshold** to apply in target
- Upon running a reactive measure, new risk index of network has to be measured from Online Risk Assessment Component



Reactive Measures

- Set of 35 reactive measures based on interviews of industrial sites including Revolution Linux
- Different types of Reactive Measures:
 - Permanent vs. Transient
 - RM_ALLOWED_HOSTS/RM_TRANSIENT_DROP_PING_PACKETS
 - Parametric vs. Non-Parametric
 - RM_REMOVE_USER/RM_RESET
 - Pattern vs. Non-Pattern
 - RM_IPTABLE/RM_LOCK_USER
 - Strict vs. Non-Strict (limiting the resources consumed)
 - RM_KILL_PROCESS/RM_MAX_FILE_LOCKS:

```
<domain> <type> <item> <value>
smith soft nofile 500
```



Future work




Future work

Trace

Attack:Start

Attack:End

- Connect the loop from detection to reaction
 - Improve Prevention mechanism by importing:
 - Alert optimization
 - Online Risk Assessment
 - Prediction



Conclusion

- Integration of SHM, Automation Fault Identification and Trace Abstraction
- Improving prevention mechanism to minimize impact to network
- Implementing a large set of Reactive Measures to counter cyberattacks:
 - limiting the resources consumed
 - protecting the quality of service for critical functions
 - Adapting the firewall configuration



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